This paper advances ways in which the understandings of “nature” and “creation” can be seen to overlap through specialized relations between humans and their environment. The hope of redemption of nature, united with evidences of grace in the advancements of science, can become helpful guides toward a theological interpretation of technology and the emerging character of human relations with nature.

Der Mathematiker Kurt Gödel hat über einen Zeitraum von 22 Jahren philosophische Bemerkungen, die so genannten Maximen Philosophie, niedergeschrieben. Sie sind in 15 Notizbüchern in der Kurzschrift Gabelsberger überliefert. Das erste Notizheft enthält allgemeine philosophische Überlegungen, die Hefte zwei und drei bestehen aus Gödels Individualethik. Die dann folgenden Notizbücher machen deutlich, dass Gödel eine Wissenschaftsphilosophie entworfen hat, in der er seine Erörterungen zu Physik, Psychologie, Biologie, Mathematik, Sprache, Theologie und Geschichte in den Kontext einer Metaphysik stellt.Erstmals wird nun an (...) der Kurt-Gödel-Forschungsstelle der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften eine vollständige, historisch-kritische Edition von Gödels philosophischen Notizbüchern vorbereitet. Im Rahmen dieser Edition erscheint jährlich ein Band. Band 1, von Gödel mit ›Philosophie I Max 0‹ betitelt, umfasst philosophische Überlegungen Gödels sowie anderer für ihn bedeutender Autoren, die er an den Anfang seines philosophischen Gesamtprojektes gestellt hat. Die Einleitung der Herausgeberin Eva-Maria Engelen bietet einen Überblick über das Korpus. (shrink)

English description: We live in a time where the old mechanisms of order have lost their grip on society, leading to numerous infractions and confrontations. In this religious-philosophical study, Kurt Wuchterl develops an epistemic perception of contingency that re-interprets the tense relationship between natural sciences and religion. Contingency always includes the "option of being different," which exacerbates pivotal problems such as chance, chaos, and unavailability. If we as individuals are not able to cope with these contingencies, we encounter the (...) edge of reason; acknowledging this edge, however, poses the question of the otherness of reason. German text. German description: Wir leben in einer Zeit, in der die alten Ordnungsgaranten ihre Orientierungskraft verloren und die Ordnungsbrueche zu vielfaltigen Konfrontationen gefuehrt haben. Kurt Wuchterl entwickelt in seiner religionsphilosophischen Studie einen epistemischen Kontingenzbegriff, mit dem das gespannte Verhaltnis der Naturwissenschaft zur Religion eine neue Deutung erfahrt.Kontingenz beinhaltet immer die Moglichkeit des Anders-sein-konnens. Und damit stellen sich zentrale Probleme wie Zufall, Chaos und Unverfuegbarkeit in verscharfter Form. Wenn es uns als Individuen nicht gelingt, diese Kontingenzen zu bewaltigen, wird die Grenze der Vernunft erreicht. Mit deren Anerkennung aber stellt sich die Frage nach dem Anderen der Vernunft. Wird dies als Chiffre des Religiosen interpretiert, zeigt sich dahinter nicht das Nichts, sondern eben gerade: ein ganz Anderes. In der Kontingenzbegegnung, wie diese Moglichkeit bezeichnet wird, scheiden sich die Geister; ihre Unbestimmtheit ist der Tribut an unsere Endlichkeit. (shrink)

De kennis van de "werkelijkheid", die zich achter den dichten nevel van veelzinnige woorden verbergt, is op het gebied der massa-psychologie wel heel moeilijk toegankelijk. Dit blijkt duidelijk uit de heerschende theorieën, inzonderheid de pessimistische theorieën van de laatste halve eeuw, over den zoogenaamd noodlottigen invloed van het saamhoorigheidsgevoel op het oordeel van de, in zulk een gevoel vereenigde, menschen. De meeste der opvattingen, die thans over de mogelijkheden en de onontbeerlijkheid der politieke propaganda worden verkondigd, passen in hetzelfde kader (...) van onklare, overdreven angstvoorstellingen betreffende de verstandelijke tekortkomingen van den mensch in de massa. Het nuchtere onderzoek, dat op de vaststelling van verifieerbare feiten is gericht, dient zich te hoeden voor de vele fouten, die vooral op het gebied der massa-psychologie plegen te worden gemaakt. Het dient zich voornamelijk bewust te zijn, dat het gevaar eener ongegronde veralgemeening hier bijzonder groot is. We zien "dè massa" niet, zelfs niet, wanneer we menschenmenigten vóór ons zien. We willen immers doordringen tot de onzichtbare gevoelens, waarvan we niet kunnen weten, in hoeverre en in welken graad ze zich van de menschen, die we zien, hebben meester gemaakt! Inderdaad zijn we dan ook niet in staat, de "massa" psychologisch te onderzoeken, maar wel afzonderlijke individuen, zij het dan ook vele individuen. Daarbij komt nog, dat de in dit verband voor de geestelijke processen gebezigde woorden zoo vaag onmogelijk zijn. We kennen bij voorbeeld zeer weinig nauwkeurige bijzonderheden, wanneer we de "meening" van een mensch "vaststellen". Want de "meening" is ook voor den enkelen mensch een min of meer vaag begrip. En voor de "openbare meening" geldt dit in het bijzonder. Voorzichtig te werk gaande, kunnen we evenwel voldoende en betrouwbare waarnemings-resultaten op dit terrein te bereiken, wanneer we door den woordnevel heendringen. Zulke resultaten worden bij voorbeeld verkregen door de waarneming van het gedrag van krantenlezers in verband met pogingen tot beïnvloeding der meening door censuur, door misleiding en andere "propaganda"-middelen. Het gedrag der krantenlezers schijnt ons veelal vol tegenstrijdigheid, maar geeft den deskundige toch een bruikbaar en scherp-omlijnd beeld van onbewuste neigingen en behoeften. Overschat wordt in den regel het aantal menschen, dat tot blinde daden van zoogenaamde massahartstocht wordt opgezweept. Het nuchtere onderzoek van de feiten toont aan, dat de meerderheid slechts de rol van radelooze en hulpelooze toeschouwster speelt, een toeschouwster, die in den grond der zaak vreedzaam en verdraagzaam is. Het gedrag der meerderheid wordt in zulke gevallen bepaald door dwang en intimidatie. De problemen der massa-psychologie, die nog niet zijn onderzocht, liggen dan ook hoofdzakelijk op dit gebied. Voornamelijk dient de werking van dwang en intimidatie -- de "moreele" en de gewelddadige intimidatie -- te worden onderzocht en haar invloed op de achteraf gevormde meening der meerderheden, die zich in radelooze gelatenheid in hun lot hebben geschikt. De door gewelddadige minderheden uitgeoefende dwang en intimidatie zijn altijd en overal de oorzaken van de ontstellende ontaardingsverschijnselen van het saamhoorigheidsgevoel, die op rekening van de "massa" worden gesteld. (shrink)

This collection consists of a two-part Introduction by the editors Martha Nussbaum and Amelie O. Rorty ; nineteen articles, mostly published here for the first time, by M. F. Burnyeat, Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, S. Marc Cohen, Jennifer Whiting, Michael Frede, K. V. Wilkes, Alan Code and Julius Moravcsik, G. E. R. Lloyd, Charlotte Witt, Gareth B. Matthews, Richard Sorabji, Cynthia Freeland, Malcolm Schofield, Dorothea Frede, Julia Annas, Franz Brentano, L. A. Kosman, Charles Kahn, and Henry S. Richardson ; (...) an extremely useful Bibliography of works cited in these twenty chapters with important additions; an Index Locorum; and a Name Index. (shrink)

This is an important volume for rounding out our understanding of the origins and dimensions of the logical empiricist project. While the existence of a Berlin wing of logical empiricism—personified principally in Hans Reichenbach and Carl G. Hempel—has been well known, in the recent reappraisal literature the spotlight has been firmly on the Vienna Circle. [...] The essays give an expansive sense of the German-Berlin context of the work of not only Reichenbach and Hempel but also their philosophical colleagues (...) class='Hi'>Kurt Grelling, Walter Dubislav, and Paul Oppenheim, their philosophical mentors and influences including Leonard Nelson and the Friesian School and Ernst Cassirer, their scientific and mathematical influences including Albert Einstein, David Hilbert, and Bertrand Russell, as well as their scientific colleagues such as Kurt Lewin and Wolfgang Köhler. (shrink)

Gegenstandes des Aufsatzes ist die gegenseitige Beeinflussung und Bezugnahme von Rudolf Carnap und Kurt Gödel in ihren jeweiligen Selbstzeugnissen während der 20er- bis 40er-Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts. Der Vergleicht bestätigt die bisherige Forschung, der zufolge Carnap auf Gödels Arbeiten der Jahre 1930 und 1931 einigen Einfluss hatte. Er zeigt darüber hinaus, dass die beiden sich größtenteils als mathematische Logiker wahrgenommen und rezipiert haben. Nach allem, was wir bisher wissen, bleibt das so hinsichtlich Carnaps Wertschätzung für Gödels Denken. Gödel wendet (...) sich hingegen Carnap ab 1934 auch als einem philosophischen Denker zu, dessen Philosophie eine gewisse Nähe zu der von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz aufweist, aber anders als letztere, von Gödel kritisch gesehen wird. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article addresses the question of whether certain experiences that originate in causes other than bereavement are properly termed ‘grief’. To do so, we focus on widespread experiences of grief that have been reported during the Covid-19 pandemic. We consider two potential objections to a more permissive use of the term: grief is, by definition, a response to a death; grief is subject to certain norms that apply only to the case of bereavement. Having shown that these objections are unconvincing, (...) we sketch a positive case for a conception of grief that is not specific to bereavement, by noting some features that grief following bereavement shares with other experiences of loss. (shrink)

Moral reasoning is individual or collective practical reasoning about what, morally, one ought to do. Philosophical examination of moral reasoning faces both distinctive puzzles — about how we recognize moral considerations and cope with conflicts among them and about how they move us to act — and distinctive opportunities for gleaning insight about what we ought to do from how we reason about what we ought to do.

The goal of this article is to motivate the idea of a social reason and demonstrate its usefulness in social theorizing. For example, in a society that values getting married young, the fact that one is young is a reason to get married. In racist and sexist societies, we have social reasons to be racist and sexist. Social reasons give rise to social requirements and obligations, where these requirements often conflict with prudential and moral requirements. My application of reasons to (...) social philosophy parallels Charles Mills' and Carole Pateman's applications of social contract theory to political philosophy. While they use social contract theory to make sense of patriarchy and white supremacy, I use the theory of normative reasons to make sense of social injustice. The theory of normative reasons meets non-ideal theory. (shrink)

"This book, one of the most frequently cited works on Martin Heidegger in any language, belongs on any short list of classic studies of Continental philosophy. William J. Richardson explores the famous turn in Heidegger's thought after Being in Time and demonstrates how this transformation was radical without amounting to a simple contradiction of his earlier views." "In a full account of the evolution of Heidegger's work as a whole, Richardson provides a detailed, systematic, and illuminating account of (...) both divergences and fundamental continuities in Heidegger's philosophy, especially in light of recently published works. He demonstrates that the "thinking" of Being for the later Heidegger has exactly the same configuration as the radical phenomenology of the early Heidegger, once he has passed through the "turning" of his way." Including as a preface the letter that Heidegger wrote to Richardson and a new writer's preface and epilogue, the new edition of this valuable guide will be an essential resource for students and scholars for many years to come. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that sight—the capacity to see or to have visual experiences—has the power to give us knowledge about things in the environment and some of their properties in a distinctive way. Seeing the goose on the lake puts me in a position to know that it is there and that it has certain properties. And it does this by, when all goes well, presenting us with these features of the goose. One might even think that it is (...) part of what it is to be a perceptual capacity that it has this kind of epistemological power, such that a capacity that lacked this power could not be perceptual. My focus in this essay is the sense of taste—the capacity to taste things or to have taste experiences. It has sometimes been suggested that taste lacks sight-like epistemological power. I argue that taste has epistemological power of the same kind as does sight, but that as a matter of contingent fact, that power often goes unexercised in our contemporary environment. We can know about things by tasting them in the same kind of way as we can know about things by seeing them, but we often do not. I then consider the significance of this conclusion. I suggest that in one way, it matters little, because our primary interest in taste is not epistemic but aesthetic. But, I end by suggesting, it can matter ethically. (shrink)

Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attractive about epistemic consequentialism while yielding predictions that are harder for the latter to (...) secure in a principled way. §2 presents Epistemic Kantianism. §3 argues that it is uniquely poised to satisfy the desiderata set out in §1 on an ideal theory of epistemic justification. §4 gives three further arguments, suggesting that it (i) best explains the objective normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (ii) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (iii) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value and obligation. §5 takes stock and reassesses the score in the debate. (shrink)

This Element offers a new account of the philosophical significance of logical empiricism that relies on the past forty years of literature reassessing the project. It argues that while logical empiricism was committed to empiricism and did become tied to the trajectory of analytic philosophy, neither empiricism nor logical analysis per se was the deepest philosophical commitment of logical empiricism. That commitment was, rather, securing the scientific status of philosophy, bringing philosophy into a scientific conception of the world.

This paper considers the place of reasons in the metaphysics of epistemic normativity and defends a middle ground between two popular extremes in the literature. Against members of the ‘reasons first’ movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole fundamental constituents of epistemic normativity. We suggest instead that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to play a role in the analysis of central epistemically normative (...) properties, and argue that the relation of possession must be analyzed in terms of competence. But while we diverge with reasons-firsters on this score, we also distance ourselves from those who deny reasons any important role in epistemology. For we maintain that possessed reasons do help to ground deontic facts in the epistemic domain (e.g., facts about what one epistemically ought to believe, may believe, or is justified in believing). Indeed, we present an argument that the possession of sufficient epistemic reasons is necessary and sufficient for propositional justification, and that proper basing on such reasons yields doxastic justification. But since possession and proper basing are themselves grounded in competence, reasons are not the end of the explanatory road: competence enables them to do their work, putting them—and us—in the middle. (shrink)

The latest volume in the Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, this work brings together some of the best and most influential recent philosophical scholarship on Nietzsche. Opening with a substantial introduction by John Richardson, it covers: Nietzsche's views on truth and knowledge, his 'doctrines' of the eternal recurrence and will to power, his distinction between Apollinian and Dionysian art, his critique of morality, his conceptions of agency and self-creation, and his genealogical method. For each of these issues, the papers (...) show Nietzsche's continuing philosophical importance. Giving a clear and accessible overview, while retaining an analytical philosophical approach throughout, this volume is essential reading for all students of Nietzsche. (shrink)

Henry S. Richardson is Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University. From 2008-18, he was the editor of Ethics. His previous books include Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Democratic Autonomy, and Moral Entanglements. He has held fellowships sponsored by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University.

Ever since it was first published 1930, William Empson's "Seven Types of Ambiguity" has been perceived as a milestone in literary criticism - far from being an impediment to communication, ambiguity now seemed an index of poetic richness and expressive power. Little, however, has been written on the broader trajectory of Western thought about ambiguity before Empson; as a result, the nature of his innovation has been poorly understood. This book remedies this omission. Starting with classical grammar and rhetoric, and (...) moving on to moral theology, law, biblical exegesis, German philosophy, and literary criticism, the author explores the many ways in which readers and theorists posited, denied, conceptualized, and argued over the existence of multiple meanings in texts between antiquity and the twentieth century. This process took on a variety of interconnected forms, from the Renaissance delight in the "elegance" of ambiguities in Horace, through the extraordinary Catholic claim that Scripture could contain multiple literal - and not just allegorical - senses, to the theory of dramatic irony developed int he nineteenth century, a theory intertwined with discoveries of the double meanings in Greek tragedy. Such narratives are not merely of antiquarian interest: rather, they provide an insight into the foundations of modern criticism, revealing deep resonances between acts of interpretation in disparate eras and contexts. This book lays bare the long tradition of efforts to liberate language, and even a poet's intention, from the strictures of a single meaning. (shrink)

Berg, J. Buñuels dagdröm.--Bergström, L. Pessimismens konsekvenser.--Furberg, M. Möjliga teser hos Johannes Climacus.--Halldén, S. Teckenrelationen och språkreglernas juridik.--Hedenius, I. Ett argument mot den rättsfilosofiska domstolsrealismen.--Mates, B. Om Platons argument "den tredje människan."--Marc-Wogau, K. Kant om lögnen.--Næss, A. Om filosofiske projekter som forener empirisk semantikk og metafysisk spekulasjon.--Ofstad, H. Får nazister lettere magesår enn humanister?--Prawitz, D. Om moraliska och logiska satsers sanning.--Stenius, E. Om Descartes' psykofysiska modell.--Tranøy, K. E. Filosofenes etiske ansvar.--Wright, G. H. von. En filosof ser på filosofien.

A classical work on Gestalt psychology from a member of the "Berlin School." Discusses perception in relation to the environment, along with action, learning, memory, and socieity.

Rationality requires us to respond to apparent normative reasons. Given the independence of appearance and reality, why think that apparent normative reasons necessarily provide real normative reasons? And if they do not, why think that mistakes of rationality are necessarily real mistakes? This paper gives a novel answer to these questions. I argue first that in the moral domain, there are objective duties of respect that we violate whenever we do what appears to violate our first-order duties. The existence of (...) these duties of respect, I argue, ensures that apparent moral reasons are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. I then extend these arguments to the domain of overall reason. Just as there are objective duties of respect for moral reasons that explain moral blameworthiness, so there are objective duties of respect for reasons that explain blameworthiness in the court of overall reason. The existence of these duties ensures that apparent reasons are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. (shrink)

A comprehensive, systematic, and historical collection of essays on Rudolf Carnap's philosophy and legacy, written by leading international experts. This volume provides a redressing of Carnap's place in the history of analytic philosophy, through his approach to metaphysics, values, politics, epistemology and philosophy of science.

This book provides an overview of different ethical views on animal experimentation. Special attention is given to the production and experimental use of genetically modified animals. It proposes a middle course between those positions that are very critical and those very positive. This middle course implies that animal experiments originating in vital human research interests are commonly justified, provided that animal welfare is taken seriously. Some animal experiments are not acceptable, since the expected human benefit is too low and the (...) animal suffering too severe. This position is supported by an argument from species care according to which we have special obligations to our children and other humans due to special relations. The book tries to bridge the gap between animal ethics and animal welfare science by discussing various conceptions of animal welfare: function-centered, feeling-based, and those focusing on natural living. The theoretical starting-point is “imaginative casuistry.” This approach stresses the role of moral imagination and metaphor in ethical deliberation, accepts a plurality of values, and recognizes the importance of case-by-case balancing. In the discussion of genetically modified animals, both intrinsic ethical concerns and animal welfare concerns are addressed. (shrink)

The Descartes Dictionary is an accessible guide to the world of the seventeenth-century philosopher René Descartes. Meticulously researched and extensively cross-referenced, this unique book covers all his major works, ideas and influences, and provides a firm grounding in the central themes of Descartes' thought. The introduction provides a biographical sketch, a brief account of Descartes' philosophical works, and a summary of the current state of Cartesian studies, discussing trends in research over the past four decades. The A-Z entries include clear (...) definitions of the key terms used in Descartes' writings and detailed synopses of his works. Also included are entries noting philosophical influences, of both figures that influenced Descartes and those that he in turn influenced. For anyone reading or studying Descartes, rationalism, or modern philosophy more generally, this original resource provides a wealth of useful information, analysis, and criticism. Including clear explanations of often complex terminology, The Descartes Dictionary covers everything that is essential to a sound understanding of Descartes' philosophy. (shrink)